Rafe Furst had been telling me why I really needed to play in the $1,500 Pot Limit Omaha-8 event that started yesterday, and his logic seemed unimpeachable. No one really plays the game, he said, so the field was bound to be unbelievably weak. Together we imagined scores of players unable to decipher their actual holdings, confusing bottom pair for nut low or drawing for all their chips with second- or third-bests. With a field like that, the value would be terrific. So I signed up and took my seat.

It took me all of 40 minutes to realize that I was only slightly less confused than many. It took an hour-and-a-half to decide that I was part of that great overlay Rafe was talking about.

But I don’t like to stay ignorant, so today I spent some time on twodimes, looking at the math of the situations I encountered. Then I went to the poker room to observe some of the best Omaha players around, including Jeff Madsen, Chau Giang, Brett Jungblut, and Chad Brown.

First to the math. I ran a bunch of hands through twodimes, and came to this conclusion: If you can tell the difference between a playable hand and a piece of garbage, chances are you’ve got no more than 60 percent pot equity preflop and no less than 40 percent. Of course, some oddities come up, where you can end up with a hand that’s completely dominated, but that’s a pretty rare case.

So if you’re holding a playable hand, anything from A-K-2-3 to 9-T-J-Q you should be trying to see a flop. As I watched the great players, I saw that they (and their tablemates) often limped. Contrast this to hold ‘em, especially late tournament hold ‘em, where limping is pretty rare. But this makes sense because in hold ‘em a player can possess (or represent) a hand that is 3 to 1 or 4 to 1 favorite against all comers. In PLO-8, the best you represent is a marginal favorite: the equivalent of A-T vs. K-Q.

A good example of a spot when limping then calling a raise was appropriate came up between Brett Jungblut and a player I didn’t recognize. Brett limped UTG, and the player to his left raised pot, thereby committing about 70 percent of his chips. Brett called and the two saw a flop of Ac-Jc-9c. Brett checked, looked at the inevitable all-in bet, then thought before folding, face-up, A-2-3-4 with the two red suits. His opponent showed a set of Aces.

When I plugged the competing hands into twodimes, you can see the reason in Jungblut's play:

Ad-2d-3h-4h vs. Ac-As-Tc-Js is a dead heat, 50/50 pot equity.
Ad-2d-3h-4h vs. Ac As 8c 5s, gives AA a 55-45 pot equity edge.

Even in a total nightmare match up, the situation isn’t all that dire:

Ac As 2c 3s vs. Ah 2d 3h 4d gives Aces a 67-32 equity advantage.

Yesterday, I made a clear tactical mistake. I made a few raises with decent hands in favorable position. Almost every time I found myself in a difficult spot, facing re-raises or looking at flops that had no relation whatsoever to my hand. I lost a lot more chips in these spots than I needed to.

The other major point that I took from both my play and my observations concerned the play of good but vulnerable hands when out of position. For example, yesterday, with blinds of 100 and 200, two players limped; the small blind (a stone) didn’t complete, and three of us saw a flop of Ad-Jd-7c. I held A-J-X-X. I bet out the pot and was called in one spot. The turn was the Qd. I checked, and then folded.

When I talked through the hand with a friend, he asked me what card I would have liked to have seen on the turn. The 9s would have been nice, we decided, but other than that there’s almost no clean card in the deck. Any paint would raise the potential of Broadway; any low card could but me in spot where I was playing for half the pot.

I saw Chau Giang enter a similar situation from the big blind. It was limped in two spots and the small blind completed. On a flop of K-J-2, two spades, Chau bet pot and was called in one spot. The turn was the Qh, and Chau checked, and his opponent bet enough for Chau to make a call for his tournament life. Chau folded and his opponent showed a hand, AA, that he said he could beat.

These are tough spots that are sometimes unavoidable, but I wonder if I (or Chau) could have looked for check raises that sealed the action. I guess what I learned here is that, if at all possible, avoid hitting two pair on a draw heavy board – or something like that.

Any advice for playing these sorts of hands from pokerwire’s readers is welcome. Leave a comment.

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